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1. The RandstadRail project
High quality lightrail network
Replacing former heavy rail, 
connecting trams and metro 
networks of 
The Hague, Rotterdam and 
Zoetermeer
Costs: 1 billion euro
Focus on the The Hague part
(500 million euro)
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2 Reason for research assignment
Start of operation in  October 
2006 with 2 months delay
Operation plagued by 
interruptions
29 November 2006 2 
derailments: TI closes down 
system
October 2007; system fully 
operational
Research assignment
Responsible portfolio holder of SGH 
(Van Woensel) requested a research to 
account for what happened
Reconstruction events from 2001 until 
start operation
No technical analysis but project set-up, 
organization  and management 
Research period: August 2007 - februari
2008
3. Findings: What caused the trouble?
13 weeks for Construction, Testing 
and Trialing (CTT) in summer 2006.
Lots of simultaneous activities
Late radical scope changes:
-Replacing switches former heavy rail 
track (7 June 2004)
-Signaling system on Zoetermeerline
(6 September 2004)
-New power stations and other 
voltage (6 December 2004)
-Replacement rails Zoetermeerline
(summer 2005)
CTT out of control: switch damaged
Too short test and trail: 3 days. 
Problems not noticed
Findings: the role of project governance 
Construction separated from 
transport operation, 
infrastructure management 
and rolling stock. 
1. Construction by The 
Hague (PORR)
Lump sum + Turn Key 
agreement. 
2. The other parts by   
Transport operator HTM
The game of project realization
1. PORR: incentive to steer on budget 
& time
- Starts in 2002
- 300 lowest cost-contracts: limited 
commitment contractors
- PORR doesn’t wait for HTM or 
Haaglanden
2. HTM: certainty on role only in 2004
- Late input expertise & wishes
- Late request scope change (signaling 
system)
- Problematic interface rolling stock-rail 
3. Prorail: not interested 
- Late information on Zoetermeerline
Consequences:
Steering on time and money + Fragmented 
set up:
reactive attitude and low trust ->
problematic system integration and late 
scope changes ->
Huge coordination load ->
Insufficient management of interfaces + 
relations ->
Overloaded CTT period + interface problems
Steering on time and money + political 
pressure
No lengthening CTT, insufficient testing
Too early start
4. Lessons from RandstadRail
Choices were unavoidable + justified
- Separation infrastructure + rest of project and asynchronous 
development: hard to avoid
- Steering on time and money: contributed to success.
But they didn’t match. Steering should have been 
complemented with:
- Management of interfaces and relationships 
- Independent anchorage of Quality and Safety 
Overall lesson:
- Due to complexity and dynamics of large projects: 
hard to optimize starting conditions. 
- This has to be counteracted by project governance
